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I. INTRODUCTION
Ever since Muslim thinkers came into contact with Greek Philosophy and
science in the seventh century, the relation between Islamic philosophy and
theology has been an uneasy one. Muslim philosophers often felt com-
pelled to defend their philosophical activities against the suspicions and
attacks of the theologians, and some developed considerable energy and
effort to the harmonization of philosophy and religion on some fundamen-
tal points.
Ghazali (d. 1111) was perhaps the most important Muslim theologian
to attack  the activities  of Muslim philosophers.  His Tahafut  al-Falasifah
(“Incoherence of the Philosophers”) constitutes the most systematic and
thorough attack on Neo-Platonism by a Muslim thinker, and has had a
considerable influence on the course of philosophical activity in Islam.
So considerable its impact was that Averroes (d. 1198), the most
prominent medieval Muslim Aristotelian, felt compelled to write a para-
graph-by-paragraph rebuttal of Ghazali’s book. As cogent and persuasive
as Averroes’ Tahafut al-Tahafut was, however, still it failed to counter the
influence which Ghazali’s work was to have on the subsequent course of
Islamic philosophy.1
Ghazali’s Tahafut is also of clear philosophical interest since in it he was
not merely content to adduce religious considerations for rejecting the
views of Muslim Neo-Platonists, as represented primarily by Ibn Sina (Avin-
cenna, d. 1037) and al-Farabi (d. 950). He sought to meet the philosophers
on their own ground. As he himself observes in al-Munqith mina’l Dhalal
(“Deliverance from Error”):
1. For a brief critical assessment of the basic line of defense used by Averroes
against Ghazali, see George Giacaman, “Tradition and Innovation: Two Muslim
Views of Causal Relations,” in Philosophie et Culture: Proceedings of the Seventeenth World
Congress of Philosophy (Montréal: Éditions Montmorency, 1986), pp. 247–49.
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I was convinced that a man cannot grasp what is defective in any of the
sciences unless he has so complete a grasp of the science in question
that he equals its most learned exponents in the appreciation of its
fundamental principles, and even goes beyond and surpasses them,
probing into some of the tangles and profundities which the very
professors of the science have neglected. Then and only then is it
possible that what he has to assert about its defects is true.2
The Tahafut itself consists of twenty questions or problems that have
relevance to religion and for which Ghazali takes the philosophers to task.
These can be divided into two broad categories: (1) questions that conflict
with some of the fundamental principles of religion and for which the
philosophers are to be charged with irreligion (kufr), and (2) questions that
do not come into conflict with a basic religious tenet, yet on account of
which, the philosophers are nevertheless to be considered to have commit-
ted heretical innovation (bid’ah). The problem of causation belongs to the
second category and is dealt with as “problem number seventeen” of the
Tahafut.
Ghazali’s examination of causality occurs in the context of his discus-
sion of the “physical sciences” (al-tabi’iyyat). His overall concern is to affirm
the omnipotence of God and to safeguard the possibility of miracles.3
Specifically, Ghazali argues against the conclusion that “[the] connection
observed between causes and effects is of logical necessity.”4 This he regards
as relevant in view of the fact that the possibility of miracles, which consti-
tute a “departure from the usual course of events” (khariqah li’l’adah, liter-
ally “violates habit”), appeared to him to conflict with the attribution of
necessary causal efficacy to inanimate particulars. As he states:
As to the first point, it is necessary to contest it, for on its negation
depends the possibility of affirming the existence of miracles which
interrupt the usual course of nature like the changing of the rod into
a serpent or the resurrection of the dead or the cleavage of the moon,
and those who consider the ordinary course of nature a logical neces-
sity regard all this as impossible . . . 5
In what follows, we present a brief critical examination of Ghazali’s
main arguments against the views of the philosophers on causation. We
2. Ghazali, al-Munqith mina’l Dhalal, in The Faith and Practice of Al-Ghazali, trans.
W. Montgomery Watt (Lahore: Sh. Muhammad Ashraf, 1963), p. 29.
3. For the Arabic text of Ghazali’s Tahafut we have used Tahafut al-Falasifah, ed.
M. Bouyges (Beirut: The Catholic Press, 1962) Henceforth: TAF. Ghazali’s text is
quoted by Averroes in his Tahafut al-Tahafut. Henceforth: TAT. We have used Simon
van den Bergh’s translation of Averroes’ Tahafut (London: Luzac & Co., 1954) as
the English translation of Ghazali’s text. TAF, p. 194; TAT, p. 1:313
4. TAF, p. 191; TAT, p. 1:312.
5. TAF, p. 192; TAT, p. 1:313.
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suggest that the phrase “departure from the usual course of events” carries
at least two meanings, only one of which is in conflict with the belief in the
idea of a causal order where events follow one another in an intelligible
manner. Furthermore, we argue that Ghazali’s desire to uphold the possi-
bility of miracles need not constrain him to repudiate the idea of necessary
connection, since he is able to explain miracles in ways that are compatible
with belief in causality and necessary connection. We conclude by examin-
ing some arguments to the effect that Ghazali’s attempt to hold onto both
miracles and necessary connection is inherently unstable; furthermore, we
explore directions which Ghazalians may take in order to counter these
arguments.
II. GHAZALI’S EMPIRICIST EPISTEMOLOGY
Ghazali begins by stating his view and then goes on to challenge the basis
of the argument of his opponents. Simply stated, his view is that the con-
nection between what is believed to be the cause and the effect is not
necessary.6 It is possible to have a cause without what we normally view as
its attendant effect, and it is possible to have an effect without what we
regard as its cause. Ghazali offers several examples to clarify his meaning:
eating and the satisfaction of hunger, contact with fire and burning, decapi-
tation and death. That hitherto each of these “causes” was followed by what
we understand to have been its effect is not due to any inherent powers or
capacities in the “causes” themselves, but is solely due to the power of God
through whose agency their concomitance has been maintained. The
connection between them is itself neither necessary nor indissoluble. More-
over, God has the power to produce satiation without eating and decap-
itation without death.
Formulated in the foregoing manner, Ghazali’s initial position does
not amount to an argument. It is a statement of a position and a point of
view. And while the text itself does contain philosophical argumentation,
Ghazali does not always separate clearly between that and a host of religious
considerations that he marshals to buttress his position.
The main thrust of Ghazali’s attack on the belief in the existence of
necessary causal connections in nature involves challenging the epistemo-
logical basis of such a belief. First of all, he argues, it can be said that the
existence of one thing with the existence of another does not show that one
exists by the other. When we ordinarily observe the constant conjunction of
some objects with others, we begin to assume that they are inextricably
connected. But what right have we to regard them as being causally con-
nected and in a necessary manner, Ghazali asks, since all we observe is the
6. TAF, p. 195; TAT, p. 1:316.
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presence of one object followed by the presence of another, and observe no
connection between them? The only argument that philosophers can pro-
duce to show that fire, for instance, has the capacity to necessarily incinerate
cotton is from observation. Observation, however, affords us no reason to
believe in the existence of anything other than conjunction. It “proves a
simultaneity, not a causation.”7 Fire, in any case, is an inanimate object and
can have no action. God is the only agent of the creation of blackness in
cotton and the disintegration of its parts, accomplished either directly or
through the intermediary of angels.8
Ghazali’s argument presupposes an empiricist epistemology. But the
foundation of the argument is not developed as it is, for instance, by Hume,
whose views on causation bear a striking resemblance to those of Ghazali.
Hume’s account of causation, it should be noted, was based, in part, on his
epistemology—in particular, his general thesis that meaningful ideas are
reducible to the sensory impressions from which they are derived. On the
basis of this, Hume proceeds to isolate the three empirical relations of
contiguity, succession, and constant conjunction as the essential elements
in our idea of causation.9
According to Hume, the idea of necessary connection is a product of
those three empirical relations. It is subjective in origin, in the sense that it
is an idea that is impressed on our minds by the constant conjunction of
certain objects and events. It has no foundation in reality, but is rather
projected by the mind upon nature.
Unlike Hume, Ghazali’s intent is not primarily the analysis of the
meaning of causation. Ghazali’s concern is to guard against compromising
divine omnipotence. This becomes a distinct possibility when miracles are
denied on the strength of a belief in a causal order which is not subject to
divine power. To achieve his end, Ghazali finds it essential to deny that
necessity and causality can be attributed to the ontological order.
Thus far, two main features of Ghazali’s position have been mentioned:
(1) his denial of the existence of a necessary causal connection between
matters of fact, which leaves him free to attribute causal agency solely to
God; and (2) the argument that observation does not support the conclu-
sion that necessary relations exist between causes and effects, but only their
constant conjunction. The first point is clearly not a philosophical argu-
ment. Rather, it is a statement of a point of view to be argued for. But
Ghazali’s argument in support of his position falls short of this mark for at
least two reasons.
Firstly, if one grants the validity of the argument, all it demonstrates is
that to the extent that our knowledge of the essential features of causal
relations between particulars is based on observation, we cannot legiti-
7. TAF, p. 196; TAT, p. 1:317.
8. TAF, p. 196; TAT, p. 1:317.
9. David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1888), bk I, pt. 3, sec. 2,6.
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mately suppose that a necessary relation exists between what we regard as
cause and effect, since we observe no such relation. It may well be that there
are necessary connections between causes and effects, but if there are any,
we are unaware of them. The evidence we possess does not afford us the
information to warrant the assertion that necessary relations obtain be-
tween matters of fact. Ghazali’s argument thus challenges the empirical
grounds for believing that effects necessarily follow their causes. Of itself,
however, the argument does not suffice to show that there are no necessary
connections between causes and effects. As Madden puts it, one needs to
be a “rigid positivist” in order to believe that failure to experience some-
thing is a good reason for believing that it does not exist.10
But secondly, and perhaps more importantly, what we have called
Ghazali’s “empiricist epistemology” can be challenged. In particular, one
can question his claim that observation shows only that something happens
with something rather than by it. The most straightforward line of question-
ing that comes to mind here is the one that G. E. M. Anscombe directs at
Hume’s claim that we are not able to perceive causality or necessary con-
nection. Anscombe claims that our use of the concept “cause” presupposes
our application of a host of causal concepts that we use in “reporting what
is observed.” As examples of causal concepts that we regularly use in report-
ing “what is observed,” she offers the following examples: scrape, push, wet,
carry, eat, burn, knock over, keep off, squash, make, and hurt. To Hume’s
challenge to produce an example of a (causal) “efficacy” that is obvious to
our consciousness or sensation,11 she replies: “Nothing easier: is cutting, is
drinking, is purring not ‘efficacy’?”12
Of course, die-hard Humeans or Ghazalians might reply that when we
observe a floor being scrubbed, or a clump of cotton going up in flames, all
our senses register is a series of appearances: first, the floor looks dirty, then
it is shiny, and one might even see bits of dirt being “detached” from the
floor, and so on. But scrubbing as such, one might say, is not really “ob-
served.” Perhaps one “infers” it from what one does see. But in so doing one
goes beyond observable evidence (as is the case with all scientific infer-
ences).
According to this line of reasoning no one really observes anything
acting on anything, or, for that matter, being acted upon. But is this really
a tenable position? Not only does it make one wonder what function all
these verbs of “action” are doing in language, but it makes one also wonder
what observation itself is, if not some kind of activity (“efficacy,” in An-
scombe’s words). When one observes, is not one doing something, namely
10. E. H. Madden, “Averroes and the Case of the Fiery Furnace,” in Islamic
Philosophy and Mysticism, ed. T. Beauchamp (Encino, CA: Dickenson Publishing
Company, 1974), p. 139.
11. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, bk I, pt. 3, sec. 14.
12. G. E. M. Anscombe, “Causality and Determinism,” in Causation and Coun-
terfactuals, ed. E. Sosa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 69.
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observing? And the mind that does the observing: is it not being affected
in a certain way by the observed object? From both sides of the relation
something is being done, and if we can be certain of this in some cases,
there is no compelling reason to think that we cannot know it in others,
such as when cotton is being consumed by fire.
III. DOES GHAZALI NEED TO DENY NECESSARY
CONNECTION?
As Kogan notes, Ghazali’s epistemological argument against belief in cau-
sality is not without irony. According to Ghazali, the only genuine example
of causal efficacy is God, and God is certainly not something of which we
have experience.13 But regardless of how successful Ghazali’s epistemologi-
cal attack on the notion of causality (a question which is important in itself,
but one which we cannot discuss fully here), we must now turn to the
question which we think we can answer in a reasonably short space: does
Ghazali really need to deny necessary connection?
As we have already indicated, Ghazali is concerned with securing the
possibility of miracles and the omnipotence of God. If we now want to
construe Ghazali’s belief that it is possible for events to depart from their
“usual course” as something that conflicts with necessary connection, then
a great deal hinges on the precise meaning of the phrase khariq li’l adah
(“departure from the usual course of events”). Ghazali’s assertion that
miracles constitute a “departure from the usual course of events” can mean
one of two things: (1) to have a cause without its normally expected effect;
for instance, decapitation without death, or contact with fire without incin-
eration. The crucial idea here is that fire does not burn cotton, even though
the nature of the particulars involved has not changed, that is, fire remains
what it is, and cotton retains its nature as we know it. What we have here is
an unambiguous case of God violating (abolishing, or suspending) “the
laws of nature.” (2) To have a cause without its usual effect, not because God
violates the laws of nature, but rather because He employs them in such a
way as to produce the remarkable impression on the minds of the ob-
servers—those around the prophet—so that they are moved to say that a
miracle has taken place.14
The first meaning of khariq li’l adah requires Ghazali to deny causal
13. Barry Kogan, Averroes and the Metaphysics of Causation (Albany: SUNY Press,
1985), p. 89.
14. This distinction can be found in E. Madden and R. Harré, Causal Powers
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1975), who point out the need for a similar distinction in
Hume’s case. Cf. Madden, “A Third View of Causality,” in Philosophical Problems of
Causation, pp. 178–89; Madden, “Hume and the Fiery Furnace,” Philosophy of Science
38 (1971): 64–69; Harré and Madden, Causal Powers, pp. 44–69.
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necessity, or to subscribe to Ash’arite occasionalism. The second meaning,
as we shall see presently, requires nothing of the sort.
How do miracles take place in accordance with meaning (2) of khariq
li’l adah? The answer is to be found in Ghazali’s own text. According to
Ghazali’s explanation:
But we still regard it as possible that a prophet should be thrown into the
fire, and not burn, either through a change in the quality of the fire or
through a change in the quality of the prophet, and that either through
God or through the angels there should arise a quality in the fire which
limited its heat to its own body, so that it did not go beyond it, but
remained confined to it, keeping, however, to the form and reality of the
fire . . . ; or that there should arise in the body of the person an attribute,
which did not stop the body from being flesh and bone, but still de-
fended it against the action of the fire. For we can see a man rub himself
in talc and sit down in a lighted oven and not suffer from it.15
This is a straightforward case of God manipulating (using to advantage) the
laws of nature, the laws which govern the behavior of flesh as well as of tar
and fire, to produce remarkable results.
There are other ways of producing miracles, ways which to our mind
exhibit a stronger degree of divine intervention, but which, to Ghazali’s
mind, still fall short of being a violation of the laws of nature:
And also the bringing back to life of the dead and the changing of a
stick into a serpent are possible in the following way: matter can receive
any form, and therefore earth and the other elements can be changed
into blood, then blood can be changed into sperm, and then sperm can
be thrown into the womb of take the character of an animal. This, is
the habitual course of nature, takes place over along space of time, but
why does our opponent declare it impossible that matter should pass
through these different phases in a shorter period than is usual, and,
and when once a shorter period is allowed there is no limit to its being
shorter and shorter, so that these potencies can always become quicker
in their action and eventually arrive at the stage of being a miracle of
a prophet.16
These examples illustrate a possible course that Ghazali can take in
order to find room for the miraculous in his system of thought. What is
significant about these examples from our point of view, is the clear admis-
sion that the fire that fails to harm the prophet is the same thing that (by
nature) burns combustible objects—that the rapidly transforming matter
described above is not a different kind of matter from the one we know.
Ghazali shows no inclination to give it different names. There can be no
question here of God’s suspending the operation of, or overriding the laws
15. TAF, p. 200; TAT, p. 1:326.
16. TAF, pp. 200–201; TAT, p. 1:327.
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of nature in the case of these miraculous occurrences. Rather, God uses or
exploits the laws in order to produce extraordinary results, in much the
same way a scientist or an engineer is able to produce extraordinary effects
by appropriate use of the laws of nature.
Now the question is bound to arise: How did Ghazali find room for the
miraculous in his system? Did he opt for a world of totally contingent
processes that depend for their occurrence, succession, and order on God’s
will? This is a world where one cannot seriously speak of the existence of
laws of nature or natural necessities as everything is so utterly dependent
on God’s will. Or does Ghazali believe in a “lawful Nature,” where every-
thing happens in accordance with natural laws, albeit ones that were laid
down by God? In the latter case, God’s role in miracles would resemble that
of the Master Engineer, who does truly wonderful things, not by violating
the laws of nature, but by using them in the proper manner.17
The issue raised here is the historical question of Ghazali’s position on
causality. This is one of the most difficult questions about Ghazali’s philoso-
phy, and opinions on this subject have been divided for some time. While
Alon correctly notes, “[m]ost writers agree that Ghazali rejected causality,”
some, such as Van den Bergh, have argued that Ghazali in the end reverts to
“the rationalistic supernaturalism of the Muslim Philosophers.”18 Still oth-
ers, sometimes on the basis of the text of the Seventeenth Discussion of
tahafut, sometimes on the basis of Ghazali’s other writings have argued that
Ghazali sought to reconcile “orthodox Islam” and philosophy, with regard to
causality.19 We will not engage these debates here as we are mainly interested
in Ghazali’s logically possible options, more than his (real or theorized) course
of action on this matter.20
17. It is possible to associate two concepts of “the miraculous” with these two
methods of accommodating miracles. Bahlul argues that the occasionalist path
leaves us with an inadequate concept of the miraculous, mainly because it makes
the terms “miracle” and “event” coextensive in the range of their application (R.
Bahlul, “Miracles and Ghazali’s First Theory of Causation,” Philosophy and Theology
2 [1990]: 145). The second concept of the miraculous which we examine in this
paper closely resembles what Kogan refers to as “the philosophers’ conception of
miracles,” where these are seen “not so much [as] interruptions of the course of
nature as they are extraordinary extensions of it” (Barry Kogan, “The Philosophers,
Al-Ghazali and Averroes on Necessary Connection and the Problem of the Miracu-
lous,” in Islamic Philosophy and Mysticism, p. 116).
18. Ilai Alon, “Al-Ghazali on Causality,” American Oriental Society Journal (100):
379; TAT, 2:182, 1:326 n.7.
19. W. J. Courntenay, “The Critique of Natural Causality in the Mutakallimun
and Nominalism,” The Harvard Theological Review 66 (1973): 77–94; B. Abrahamov,
“Al-Ghazali’s Theory of Causality,” Studia Islamica 67 (1988): 75–98.
20. Special mention should be made of L. E. Goodman, “Did Ghazali Deny
Causality?” (Studia Islamica 47 [1978]: 83–120) and M. E. Marmura, “Al-Ghazali’s
Second Causal Theory in the Seventeenth Discussion of his Tahafut,” (in Islamic
Philosophy and Mysticism) because they both examine the text of the Seventeenth
Discussion in relation to Ghazali’s other writings. Nevertheless, they are still able to
reach opposing conclusions.
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Still, it may be thought that Ghazali’s expressed need to criticize the
philosophers for saying that “the existence of the cause without the effect
or the effect without the cause is not within the realm of the contingent or
possible” shows that Ghazali is not neutral between the two ways of accom-
modating miracles. This, however, is by no means obvious. One who denies
that it is necessary that the removal of a person’s kidneys (cause) is followed
by his death (effect) need not be denying any natural necessities. He or she
may be just thinking of kidney machines or some scientifically possible
method of doing what the kidneys do.
Of more interest to us is the viability of the “non-occasionalist” path,
which we claim is open to Ghazali. Can one really believe in the existence
of a law-governed nature and still think that miracles can take place? We
shall discuss this option below.
IV. MIRACLES AND CONCEPTS OF IMPOSSIBILITY
The miracles Ghazali discusses in his chapter on causality are not all of one
type. But what is more important for determining the viability of his options
is that the suggested explanations of “how miracles can still take place” are
not identical. There is at least one type of miracle (together with its expla-
nation) that does not seem to comport well with belief in causality and the
existence of a natural order.
For clarity’s sake, let us begin with one type of miracle that does not
seem to trouble Ghazali when it comes to explaining concepts that the
philosopher and believers in causality are willing to accept. This is the
miracle of Abraham surviving immolation by the unbelievers. Ghazali notes
that a person who covers himself with talc and sits in a lighted oven suffers
no harm, and hints that it is conceivable that God may have intervened in
Abraham’s case in some such fashion, much as a knowledgeable, inventive
human engineer (or scientist) might bring about truly impressive effects by
suitable use of the laws of nature.
Now all of this may be acceptable. But consider Moses’ miracle: the rod
turning into a serpent. Ghazali sees this as happening in terms of matter
“passing through phases in shorter periods.” And
when once a shorter period is allowed there is no limit to its being
shorter and shorter, so that these potencies can always become quicker
in their action and eventually arrive at the stage of being a miracle of
a prophet.21
But is this plausible? Many philosophers are bound to object that
Ghazali does not seem to realize that many laws of nature have a temporal
21. TAF, pp. 200–201; TAT, p. 1:327.
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dimension, which will become apparent when care is taken to formulate
them exactly and explicitly. Consider, for example, the law Galileo arrived
at from his study of the behavior of falling objects. According to this law, the
distance covered by a falling object is proportional to the square of time.
This means that if a body covers a certain distance by the end of the first
second of its fall, then it is expected to cover a certain definitely known
greater distance by the end of the second and third seconds of its fall. There
can be no question of covering lesser or greater distances. Coverage of
distance proceeds without question at a certain definite rate. Were a body
to do otherwise in the same circumstances, the laws of nature would be
completely violated.
The idea that natural processes take place at “certain rates” and not
others is well attested. Many kinds of processes have “periods”—pregnan-
cies have terms, different kind of plants grow at definite rates, and so on.
And while some processes can be accelerated in certain circumstances, all
activities occur within parameters set by laws that are more ultimate than
those we can take advantage of in order to produce accelerated natural
processes. For example, we can increase an object’s velocity by subjecting
that object to greater and greater forces (all in accordance with the laws of
physics). However, if the theory of relativity is to be believed, no object can
exceed the speed of light. This is a law of nature, not something that merely
happens to be the case.
Given this, what can Ghazali say in order to explain Moses’ miracle? He
can certainly look for a more conservative explanation of the rod/serpent
miracle, along the lines of his explanation of Abraham’s miracle, which
does not necessarily fly in the face of natural laws. But there is a somewhat
more radical approach that Ghazali can avail himself of, which does not
seem to be subject to these difficulties. It has a general character that
relieves one from the need to pay attention to the details of ever-changing
scientific theories. It can be explained thus.
It is well known that, as his examples of impossibilities illustrate,
Ghazali restricts the necessary to what is “logically or analytically necessary.”
Toward the end of the Seventeenth Discussion he says:
the impossible cannot be done by God, and the impossible consists in
the simultaneous affirmation and negation of a thing, or the affirma-
tion of the more particular with the negation of the more general, or
the affirmation of two things with he negation of one of them, and what
does not refer to this is not impossible, and what is not impossible can
be done.22
Given this, it is open to Ghazali to question the necessity of the entire
natural causal order, where fire causes combustion, and where decapitation
22. TAF, p. 203; TAT, p. 1:329.
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leads to death, and so on. He could question it, not from perspective of a
Humean, who is willing to entertain the picture of “cotton-engulfed-in-fire-
but-not-burning,” but from the perspective of someone who believes that our
world, with all its natural-causal laws (where fire burns, and so on) is only one
of many logically possible worlds (with different systems of causal-natural
laws) that God could have created. After all, to our minds it is not impossible
that falling objects should accelerate at a slightly different rate from the one
which Galileo discovered, or that light should travel at a different speed than
the one we know. Of course, a change here or there in the laws of nature as we
know them might logically necessitate changes and adjustments elsewhere in
the system of nature. But this does not prevent us from imagining systems,
whole and entire, that differ from the one we know.
In this light, one might look at the rod/serpent miracle as taking place
within the confines of a different system of laws, ones that do allow for matter
to be manipulated in ways that are ruled out by our familiar causal/natural
laws. If God were to do this, would this be a violation of “the laws of nature?”
Not really. Imagine persons who invent games (chess, backgammon), and
freely assign (consistent) rules for these game. If one took the game of chess
(as we know it) and made the pawn move three squares at a time, that agent
would be violating “the laws of chess.” But if the inventor were to abolish the
whole game, replacing it with another, the “laws of the game” would not be
violated. Changes in the game are one thing, changes of the game are a
different matter entirely. The laws of the game are not “self-necessitating,”
and there is nothing in them that guarantees their continued holding.
It could be the same with the laws of nature, according to Ghazali.
Given the laws (as we know them), fire has to burn, and dead matter (rod)
becomes “live” (if it ever does) only at a certain rate, and after going
through phases that have to last this long (much longer than is required for
a prophet’s miracle). But Ghazali need not accept the idea (nobody really
does) that the laws of nature are logically necessary, that things could not
happen differently. The world could be have been otherwise. Perhaps what
happens during a prophet’s miracle is that the world (temporarily at least)
is otherwise, as far as the laws it obeys are concerned. In this case, a miracle
need not be a violation of causal laws, but merely something that happens
in accordance with a different set of causal laws.
This, we think, is one direction that Ghazali can take. It comes with an
“uncertainty price”; one is bound to wonder: How can we ever be sure that
God will not choose to replace the laws of nature with another set at any
minute? This is, of course, reminiscent of the epistemological difficulties
that follow from Ghazali’s explorations of the “occasionalist” path, which is
subject to the “absurdities” (tashni’at) that he tries very hard to rebut in the
Seventeenth Discussion.23
In the end, Ghazali is left in as comfortable a position as that of Hume,
23. TAF, pp. 198–99; TAT, p. 1:323.
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who could not be certain about the future either. But this is probably a
result that we must endure, no matter what our views of miracles or the laws
of nature are. The laws of physics (of nature as whole) do not have the
necessity, certainty, or self-evidence of the laws of mathematics and logic. It
makes no sense to wonder whether 1 and 1 will make 2 next week, simply
because we do not really understand what it means for 1 and 1 not to make
2. But we can certainly understand what it would mean for falling objects to
begin (next week) accelerating at a rate which is proportional, not to the
square of time, but the cube of time, or something entirely different.
It is significant that some philosophers claim that the (skeptical)
Humean predicament is the human predicament. But in the case of phi-
losophers such as Ghazali, the predicament is alleviated by the belief in the
existence of a God, who, although powerful and unpredictable, is neverthe-
less good, and thus can be trusted not to toy with us. Hence, it need not be
thought that the “non-occasionalist” method of accommodating belief in
the possibility of miracles that Ghazali can (or does) offer is hopeless.
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